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As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, a mortgagee who contracts for a first lien may
Attorney and recover the difference in value between that and
what he gets, from the attorney who undertakes
Client,
to search the record for her, but negligently overNccraln o
Cause
of Action

looks prior liens; and may sue as soon as the
inadequacy of her security becomes apparent,

without waiting to see if any loss will result from an attempt
to collect the loan. Lawall v. Groman, 37 Atl. Rep. 98.
Whenever one fails to perform a duty imposed by contract,
the mere breach of duty is supposed to cause damage to the
other party. A right of action in assumpsit or tort, therefore,
accrues at the moment of the breach, for nominal damages
at least, and the statute of limitations runs against it from that
time: Brown v. Howard, 2 Brod. & B. 73, 1820; Battley v.
Faulkner, 3 B. & Aid. 288, 1820; Betts v. Norris, 21 Me.
314, 1842; Schadev. Gehner, (Mo.) 34S. W. Rep. 576, 1896;
Bk. of Utica v. Childs, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 238, 1826; Kerns v,
Sctoonmaker, 4 Ohio, 331, 1830; Townsend v. Eichelberger,
51 Ohio St. 213, 1894. This principle applies to an action
for negligence on the part of an attorney, which is a breach of
his contract of service: Short v. McCarthy, 3 B. & Ald. 626,
1820; Howell v. Young, 5 B. & C. 259, 1826; Green v.Dixon,
I Jur. 137, 1837; Blytht v. Fladgate,[1891] I Ch. 337, 1890;
Wilcox v. Plumer, 4 Pet. 172, 18 30; Denton v. Embury, 5 Eng.
(Ark.) 228, 1849; Crawford v. Gaulden, 33 Ga. 173, 1862;
Lilly v. Boyd, 72 Ga. 83, 1883 ; Gouldv. Palmer,(Ga.) 22 S.E.
Rep. 583, 1895 ; Staffordv. Richardson, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 302,
1836; Arnold v. Robinson, 3 Daly, (N. Y.) 298; Douglass v.
Corry, 46 Ohio St. 349, 1889; Campbell v. Boggs, 48 Pa. 524,
1855 ; Moore v. Juvenal,92 Pa. 484, 188o; Thomas v. Erwin,
387
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Cheves, (S. Car.) 22, 1839. The measure of damages in such
a case is the injury that appears to have been caused at the timeby the negligen.t act; e. g., in taking insufficient security for a
loan, the difference between the value of the loan and the
actual value of the security with interest and costs: Russell v..
Palmer, 2 Wils. 325, 1767; Allen v. Clark, ii W. R. 304,

1863 ; LowenburgV. Wolley, 25 Can. S. C. R. 51, 1895 ; Millerv. Wilson, 24 Pa. 114, 1854.

One who finds the ticket office at a station closed, and gets
upon a train in ignorance of the fact that it does not stop at
the station to which he wishes to go, is not a.
Carriers,
Passengers
trespasser, but is entitled to remain on the train,
as a passenger, to the first regular stopping place, by paying
his fare thereto; and the offer of a person, in company with theplaintiff and others on a train, to pay fare for all the party,
accompanied with the taking out of his pocket
Tender of
Fare
money more than sufficient to pay all their fares,.
before the conductor ordered the plaintiff off or made any
attempt to stop the train, is a sufficient tender of fare to makea subsequent refusal of the conductor to carry them, followed
by their expulsion, wrongful: Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v..
Norris, (Appellate Court of Indiana,) 46 N. E. Rep. 564.
When a train runs beyond a passenger's station, at night,.
without his knowledge, it is not negligence for the passenger
Contributory to assume that the car is at the station platform,
Negligence
if invited to alight by the employes of the carrier,.
the ground being so covered with snow that its surface could
not be distinguished: Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Friel,
(Court of Appeals of Kentucky,) 39 S. W. Rep. 704.
The Court of Appeals of New York has practically reversed.
the ruling of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court,
Constitutional
Law,
Ex Post Facto

Pople v. Hawker, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 516; 36,
AM. L. REG. N. S. 256, that astatute declaring

guilty of a misdemeanor any one who, after conLaw
viction of a felony, shall practice medicine, applies to one con-victed before the passage of the act, and is not expostfator-
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although the judgment of conviction was affirmed: People v.
Hawker, 46 N. E. Rep. 607. Three only, of the seven judges
maintained this point. Two concurred in the result solely on
the ground that the record did not show that the defendant
was ever a physician, and the other two dissented. (See note
in tlis number.)
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has lately
ruled that it is within the police power of the legislature to order
Police Power the destruction of a tree affected by the "peach
yellow," without compensation to the owner, and
against his will, and may impose a fine for failure to destroy
the trees condemned; and since the summary destruction by
the state of trees affected with "peach yellows" is within the
rule that whatever is dangerous to public health may be summarily abated, the owner has no right, before the trees are
condemned, to a jury trial of the question whether they are so
diseased: State v. Main, 37 Atl. Rep. 8o.
In response to interrogatories submitted to it by the Senate,
the Supreme Court of Colorado has declared, that legislation
which has for its object the protection of laborers
Scrip and
Store Order from oppression and fraud, by prohibiting eqmActs
ployers from issuing, in payment of wages, scrip
or store orders redeemable in goods at exorbitant prices, may
properly be enacted under the police power of the state; but
that if such a statute undertakes to regulate the prices at
which merchandise shall be sold by an employer to his
employes for cash, it is unconstitutional: In re House Bill, No.
147, 48 Pac. Rep. 512.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has recently decided that a
notary public has no power to commit for conContempt,
tempt a witness, who, having been duly subpoenaed
Powers of
Notary Public before him, refuses to be sworn or to give his
deposition; and a statute which purports to' confer such a
power is unconstitutional: In re Huron, 48 Pac. Rep. 574.
It is a criminal contempt to publish of a judge, that his
decision in a case pending is influenced by political or money
considerations, and the offender may be imprisoned therefor, as
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well as fined: Bloom v. People, (Supreme Court of Colorado,)
48 Pac. Rep. 5 19.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has applied the familiar rule
that parties cannot oust the jurisdiction of the courts by conContract,
Ousting
Jurisdiction

of Court,

tract, to the rules of a railway relief department,
which provided that all claims of beneficiaries
should be submitted to the determination of the

Rule of
Railway Relief
Department

superintendent, whose decision should be final
and conclusive, unless appealed to the advisory
committee, and in case of such appeal the decision of the
committee should be final and conclusive upon all parties,
without exception or appeal,-holding that after the rejection
of a valid claim by the advisory committee, the beneficiary
could maintain an action for the recovery of the money due
thereon, in spite of that rule: Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v.
Stanhard,46 N. E. Rep. 577.
When an insolvent merchant procures the organization of a
corporation, retaining substantially all of the stock therein,
Corporations, and transferring the bulk of his property to it, for
Incorporation, the purpose of delaying and hindering his creditors,
Fraud on
Creditors

and no innocent person contributes any substantial
sum to the assets of the corporation, the whole transaction is a
sham, and the property of the corporation may be levied upon
by the creditors of the promoter, and sold to satisfy their
claims: Kelloggv. Douglas Co. Bk., (Supreme Court of Kansas,)
48 Pac. Rep. 587.

The Supreme Court of Colorado has ruled, in accordance
with the weight of authority, that in the absence of any statute
CriminalLaw, changing the rule of the common law, the district
Nolle
attorney, who represents the attorney general in
Prosequi,
Power of
his own district, has the power to enter a nolle
District
Attorney

prosequi in a criminal case without the consent of
the court : Peoplev. DistrictCourtof Lake Co., 48 Pac. Rep. 5oo.
This power is not unlimited, however. There are three
stages in a criminal prosecution, viz. : (i) The inauguration or
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preliminary stage, when the indictment is absolutely under the
control of the prosecuting officer; (2) The trial of the cause
and its incidents, during which the court has control, and the
power of the prosecuting officer is suspended; and (3) The
period between the verdict of the jury and sentence by the
court, when the pardoning power of the governor attaches:
State v. Moire, (La.) i8 So. Rep. 943, 1895. Accordingly,
the power of the district attorney to enter a nolle prosequi is
subject to the following limitations: (i) After the jury has
been impaneled and the charge read, he cannot discontinue if
the defendant insists upon a verdict ; and (2) After verdict and
refusal to grant a new trial, he cannot dismiss the prosecution
without the leave of the court: State v. Klock, (La.) 18 So.
Rep. 942, 1895. See 35 AM. L. Reg. N. S. 7.

The Queen's Bench Division has lately held, that when a
voter has the option of cumulating his votes, he must indicate
an intention to do so by putting opposite the
Elections,
name of the candidate for whom he intends to
Marking
Ballots,

Cumulative
Voting

cumulate either crosses or figures indicating the
number of votes he intends to cast for him; and

that if he does not do so, the court will not presume that he
intended to cast but a single vote, although he marks but a
few names or only one: Morris v. Beves, [1897] 1 Q. B. 449.
In this case, there were fifteen candidates to be elected. Some
of the voters marked a cross opposite the name of but one candidate, and others opposite three, five, or more; but in each
case it was held that but one vote could be counted for the
candidates marked, in the absence of figures or crosses to
indicate a different intention.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, under the ballot laws of that state, which
authorize no additions to the official ballot except
Stickers
the insertion of names in blank spaces under the
titles of offices thereon, there can be no election to an office,
the name or title of which is not printed on the ballot, by
putting on stickers bearing the title of the office and the name
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of the candidate : In re Contested Election of Lawlor, 37 Atl.
Rep. 92.
The Australian ballot laws do not prohibit the use of printed
adhesive slips, or " stickers :" DeWalt v. Bartley, 146 Pa. 529,
1892, affirming I D. R. (Pa.) 199, 1892; but under the decision
above, they must contain only the name of the candidate to be
voted for, and be inserted in the proper space in the blank
column printed for that purpose. Afortiori these laws do not
permit the use of a printed blanket slip of the size of a column
of the official ballot, with the names of a series of candidates,
by the pasting of which on the ballot the titles of offices and
the spaces for candidates' names designated on the official
ballot are obliterated. Other considerations apart, the use of
such a slip would enable the voter to prepare his ballot outside
of the voting room, contrary to the requirements of the act:
In re ContestedElection of School Directorsof Little Beaver Twp.,
165 Pa. 233, 1895, affirming 15 Pa. C. C. 8I, s. c., 3 D. R.
685, 1894.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has lately held, that the
construction and operation, on a public street, of an electric
railway extending between two or more towns or
Eminent
Domain,
villages, and incorporated for the transportation of
Additional
merchandise, personal baggage, mail and express
Servitude
matter, as well as passengers, imposes an additional burden.
for which the abutting owners are entitled to compensation,
and is not merely an exercise of the public easement previously
acquired by the construction of the street: Chicago & N. W.
Ry. Co. v. Milwaukee, R. & K. Electric Ry. Co., 70 N. W.
Rep. 678.
According to another decision of the last mentioned court,
when a mortgagee agrees to discontinue foreclosure, in consideration of the application of the rents of the
Equitable
mortgaged land on his debt, and the mortgagor
Assignment,
Rents
instructs his agent to pay over the rents, as collected, to the mortgagee, this instruction constitutes an equitable assignment of the rents, so that, when collected and
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in the hands of the agent, they are not subject to garnishment
by a judgment creditor of the mortgagor: Baillie v. Curie,
.70 N. W. Rep. 66o.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee has lately ruled that when
a decree simply adjudged a husband, who was trustee for his
wife, individually liable for a certain debt of the
Equity,
BilltoEnlarge wife, on the ground that he had received from her
Decree
former trustee an estate more than sufficient to
pay the debt, a bill by the creditor to charge the wife's
separate estate with the debt was a bill to enlarge the decree,
and could not lie, although the decree recited that "for the
payment of said debt said estates were liable;" no estate being
-described or ordered to be sold to satisfy the debt: Helms v.
Rizer, 39 S. W. Rep. 718.
When a grantor who has no title purports to grant a particular piece of land by deed to one for life, with remainder
over, and the grantee for life enters upon the land
Estoppel,
Deed by
under the deed, and acquires a good title by posGrantor
Having no
session against the true owner, he is estopped as
Title
against the remainderman from disputing the
validity of the deed: Dalton v. Fitzgerald,(Chancery Division,
Stirling, J.,) [1897] I Ch. 44o.
On an issue as to the substance of a conversation carried on
by telephone, one of the speakers cannot testify
that he repeated to a third person what he had
heard from the other: German Say. Bk. of Davenport v. Citizens' Nat. Bk. of Davenport, (Supreme Court of
Iowa,) 7o N. W. Rep. 769.
Evidence,
Telephone
Fonversation

A false representation that one has extraordinary and supernatural power to cure disease is a representation as to an
False
existing fact, and is not affected by a promise
Pretences,

simultaneously made, to exercise that alleged

Supernatural

Powers
power in the future to cure the person to whom
the representation is made: Jules v. State, (Court of Appeals
of Maryland,) 36 Atl. Rep. 1027.

This decision is supported by the weight of authority: R. v.
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Giles, io Cox C. C. 44, 1865; R. v. Lawrence, 36 L. T. N. S.
404, 1877; Commonwealth v. Gordon, 15 W. N. C. 282, 1884.
The case of State v. Burnett, 119 Ind. 392, S. C. 21 N. E.

Rep. 972, 1889, which decided, on the other hand, that a claim
by the defendant that he was a witch doctor, and had the
power to kill witches, that the prosecutor was beifig bothered and tormented by witches, and that if the prosecutor
would give him certain articles he would kill and destroy all
the witches and save the prosecutor and his family from further
trouble, was not a false pretence, because it was not such a
representation as a man of common understanding was justified
in relying on, and was not a representation of an existing fact,
but a mere expression of opinion, is without authority. Afalse pretence need not be in regard to a fact which does in.
reality exist, but may be a representation that a fact exists;
when it does not exist. See 14 CRIM. L. MAG. I, 4.
A paper purporting to authorize the bearers to solicit sub-.
scriptions for a labor organization is not a "letter of attorney,"
or an "1order for money," within the meaning of a
Forgery
statute making such instruments the subject of'
forgery: People v. Smith, (Supreme Court of Michigan,) 70N. W. Rep. 466.

In Edelman v. Latskaw, (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,>
36 At. Rep. 926, an executor sold some certificates of stock,
belonging to the estate of his father, and conFraud,
Fraudulent
sidered worthless, for a nominal sum. He subRepresentations sequently received

a letter, directed to the

decedent, offering two dollars a share for the stock; whereupon he tried to repurchase it from the purchaser at the sale,
stating to him that he wanted it, because his father had held.
it so long, and that it had no market value. On the strength
of these representations, the stock was resold to him. After
discovering the facts, the purchaser sued him for fraudulent
representations; and the court below entered a compulsorynonsuit; but this judgment was reversed by the supreme.
court, which held that the action could be maintained.
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The Court of .Appeals of Maryland, adopting the rule of
Teason and justice, has recently held, that under the Code of
that State, Art. 99, § 13, as amended by the act
Game,
Close: Season of 1894, c. 404, which provides that "No person
shall shoot or in any manner catch, kill, or have in his possession ..... .any rabbit, between the twenty-fourth of December and the first of November next ensuing," the possession
,between those dates, of rabbits lawfully killed in another state,
is not unlawful: Dickhaut v. State, 37 Atl. Rep. 21.
There is a note on this subject in 35 Am. L. REG. N. S. 649.
To the cases there cited as upholding the rule laid down above,
.- nay be added State v. McGuire, 24 Oreg. 367, 1893.
When a garnishee corporation, doing business in two states,
has been compelled to pay a judgment rendered
Judgment against it in the tourts of one state, that judgment
Rendered In
may be pleaded in bar in garnishment proceedings
One State,
Bar to Action in another state at the suit of another creditor to
In Another
reach the same debt, though the latter suit was
"Garnishment,

commenced first: Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Corbetts, (Supreme
Court of Illinois,) 46 N. E. Rep. 63 1.
In State v. Countryman, 48 Pac. Rep. 137, the Supreme
Court of Kansas has decided that a man has no right to repel
Homicide,
-Self Defense,
Imminent

Danger,
Charlvarl

a "charivari" party by the use of deadly weapons,
on the principle that although one may defend
himself and his family with such weapons from a
felonious assault, if necessary to protect them

from such assault, and may also defend his habitation from a
like assault by the use of like weapons, if necessary to preserve it from destruction or serious injury, he has no right to
resist with such weapons an attack upon his person, family, or
habitation which is not felonious,-i. e., an assault not made
under such circumstances, and with such means, and under
such appearances as to justify a belief in imminent danger of
great bodily harm to the person, or destruction or serious
injury to the habitation-such as the attack of such a party.
This lays down a stricter rule than that announced by the
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Supreme Court of Michigan in Patten v. People, i8 Mich.
314, 1869, under similar circumstances, where the defendant, fearing that his mother might be seriously injured
by fright caused by the noise, went out of the house with an
axe in his hand, hit one of the party a blow with the axe,
which resulted in his death. The court held, per Christiancy, J. t
"There was evidence-and the statement of the prisoner made
in the trial must for this purpose be treated as such-from
which the jury might have found (as supposed in part of thecharge given by the court below) that the defendant took theaxe from the house for the purpose of self defense, and stepped
out of the door for the purpose of inducing the rioters to leave,
or of dispersing them : and that as he stepped out, the crowd
cried out, 'Kill him, damn him, kill him,' and that rushing
towards him, some one or more of them hit him with a gun or
club or other weapon. If this hypothesis should be found to
be true, instead of the charge given by the court, the jury
should, I think, have been told substantially that the defendant was excusable for acting according to the surrounding
circumstances as they appeared to him; and if, from these
circumstances, he believed there was imminent danger of death
or great bodily harm to himself or any member of his family,
then, if he had already tried every other reasonable means
which would, under the circumstances, naturally occur to an
honest and humane man, to ward off the danger or repel the
attack, he might resort to such forcible means, even with a
dangerous weapon, as he believed to be necessary for protection; and if such means resulted in the death of any of thesupposed assailants, the homicide would be excusable."
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has recently declared
constitutional a statute, (Gen. Stat. Minn., 1894, § 5,i65,4
Husband
which provides, that "when a husband has deserted
Ad Wife,
his family the wife may prosecute or defend in his

Desertion,
Rights of Wife

name any action which he might have prosecuted
or defended, and shall have the same powers and rights thereinas he might have had: " Allen v. Minnesota Lo=a & Trust Co.;.
70 N. W. Rep. Soo.
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The conveyance of two hundred acres of land by a father to
his minor children, in contemplation of a second marriage, is
not in itself a fraud on the marital rights of the
Fraud on
Marital
second wife, when he retains eighty acres, upon
Rights
which are all the improvements made on his land:
Goodman v. Macon, (Court of Appeals of Kansas, Northern
Dept., D. C.,) 48 Pac. Rep. 439.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has joined the ranks of
those who hold that under the married women's
Husband and
Wife,
acts, a wife may naintain an action against
Alienation of
Husband's
persons who wrongfully entice her husband
Affections,

from her and alienate his affections, and thereby
cause a separation between them: Lockwood v.Lockwood,70
N. W. Rep. 784.
It seems never to have been seriously doubted that a husband has a right of action, per quod consortium mist, against
one who alienates the affections of his wife; and it is the
general doctrine that a wife has also a right of action against
any one who alienates the affections of her husband, though
unable to avail herself of it under the common law, because
of the legal fiction of the merger of her identity in that of her
husband. But where the married women's property acts are
in force, this reason is removed, and the right of the wife to
recover in such a case is commensurate with that of her
husband, whether the statute confers upon her the express
power of suing, or not: Waldron v. Waldron, 45 Fed. Rep.
315, 1890; Williamsv. Williams, 20 Colo. 5i, 1894; Foot v.
Card, 58 Conn. 1, 1889 ; Bassett v. Bassett, 20 Ill. App. 543 ;
Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 1891, overruling Logan v.
Logan, 77 Ind. 558, I88i ; Wof v.Wof, 130 Ind. 599, 1892;
Holmes v. Holmes, 133 Ind. 386, 1892; Wan-en v. Warren,
89 Mich, 123, i89I; Rice v. Rice, (Mich.) 62 N. W. Rep.
833, 1895 ; Clow v. Chapman, 125 Mo. 101, 1894;' Nicholsv.
Nizols, (Mo.) 35 S. W. Rep. 577, 1896; Hodgkinson v.
Hodgkinson, 43 Neb.269, 1895; Adams v.Seaver, 66 N. H.
142, 1889; Breiman v. Paasc, 7 Abb.N.C.(N.Y.) 249, 1879;
Baker v. Baker, i6 Abb. N. C. (N.Y.) 293, 1885; Warner
v. Ziller, 17 Abb. N. C., (N. Y.) 221, 1885; Churchill v.
Right to Sue
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Lezvis, 17 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 226, 1885; Jaynes v. Jaynes, 39
Hun, (N. Y.) 40, 1886; Bennett v. Bennett, i16 N. Y. 584,
1889, which finally overruled Van Arnam v. Ayers, 67 Barb.
(N. Y.) 544, 1877;Eldredgev.Eldredge, 79 Hun,(N. Y.)511,
1894; Mainwarren v. Mason, 79 Hun, (N. Y.) 592, 1894;
Van Olinda v. Hall, 88 Hun, (N. Y.) 452, 1895; Contra, Doe
v. Roe, 82 Me. 503, 189o; Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374,
1890. Accordingly, she may maintain an action on this ground
against the paramour of her husband: Foot v. Card, 58 Conn.
I, 1889; or against the husband's parents: Mehrhoff v.
Nehrhoff, 26 Fed. Rep. 13, 1886; Williams v. Williams, 20
Colo. 5', 1894; Postlewaite v. Postlewaite, I Ind. App. 473,
i891 ; Railsbackv. Railsback, 12 Ind. App. 659, 1895; Price
v. Price, 91 Iowa, 693, 1894; Bailey v. Bailey, (Iowa,) 63 N.
W. Rep. 341, 1895; Eldredge v. Fldredge, 79 Hun, (N. Y.)
511, 1894; Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621, 1878; or
against any stranger, whose conduct has occasioned the alienation: Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 1861. But when
the suit is against a parent, something more must be proved
than mere advice to the husband to leave his wife, for a parent
may, when acting in good faith, advise his son thus, without
incurring liability : Huling v. Huling, 32 Ill. App. 519, 1889;
Rice v. Rice, (Mich.) 62 N. W. Rep. 833, 1895; Ticker v.
Tucker, (Miss.) 19 So. Rep. 955, 1896; Pollock v. Pollock, 29
N. Y. Suppl. 37, 1894; Young v. Young, 8 Wash. 81, 1894;
and consequently the complainant in such a case must allege
that the acts which produced the alienation were maliciously
done: Reedv. Reed, 6 Ind. App. 317, 1892.
A wife may maintain such an action, though she be still
living with her husband: Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. I, 1889; or
after divorce for the husband's fault, if the alienation occurred
before the divorce: Clow v. Chapman, 125 Mo. 101, 1894;
but if she leaves him of her own accord, before procuring a
divorce, she cannot recover after it is procured : Buckel v. Suss,
21 N. Y. Suppl. 907, 1893, affirming 18 N. Y. Suppl. 719.
She may recover for mental anguish,.mortification, and injured
feelings, occasioned by the loss of her husband's affections,
without showing actual loss of support: Rice v. Rice, (Mich.)
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62 N. W. Rep. 833, 1895; And may recover exemplary
damages, under a statute (Laws Colo. 1889, p. 64,) authorizing such a recovery when the injury complained of is the
result of a "wanton and reckless disregard of the injured
party's rights and feelings:" Williams v. Williams, 20 Colo.
5I, 1894. She cannot, however, bring an action of crim. con.
against the paramour of her husband, even where the married
women's property acts are in force: Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503,
189o; Kroessin v. Keller, 6o Minn. 372, 1895.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma, when two parties are contending before the United
States land department for a tract of government
land, and the final decision is had in favor of one
of them, the successful party may bring an action
with
Possession of in the territorial court for an injunction to restrain
Land
his adversary from further interfering
with his
Injunction

To Restrain
Interference

possession of the premises; and in that cause the court may
properly award an injunction which prevents the unsuccessful
party from remaining in occupation of the disputed premises:
Barnes v. Newton, 48 Pac. Rep. 19o.
This follows two prior decisions of the same court: Reaves
v. Oliver, 3 Okl. 62, 1895 ; Woodruff v. Wallace, 3 Okl. 355,
1895.

When an accident insurance policy is issued, renewable
yearly as long as the assured pays the specified premium in
Insurance, advance and the insurance company consents to
Accident,
receive it, and requiring the assured at each renewal
Renewal,

Effect
to give notice of any change in his state of health
since the payment of the last premium, with power for the
company in each case to determine the policy, an entirely new
contract arises upon the payment of the premium for each
year, for that year only, and the amount payable under it on
the accidental death of the assured in the current year for
which a premium has been paid is not affected by any assignment or other obligation made or entered into by the assured
in any previous year and not extending to after-acquiied
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property: Stokell v. Ijeywood, (Chancery Division, Kekewich,
J.,) [1897] i Ch. 459.
A plaintiff who is injured by falling from his bicycle while
returning home from a friend's funeral, on Sunday, though
Sunday Laws not by the direct road, may recover under a policy
of accident insurance, though it contains a clause
preventing recovery for an injury received " while or in consequence of violating any law." Riding to a funeral, or walking
or riding for health or exercise, on Sunday, does not fall within
the prohibition of the Sunday laws: Eaton v. Atlas Accident
Ins. Co., (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine,) 36 Atl. Rep. 1048.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi. in Stephens v. Railway
Officials' & Emloyes' Acc. Assn., 21 So. Rep. 71o, has rendered a very important decision in regard to the
Policy,
Construction construction of an accident insurance policy.
The
first paragraph of the policy in question provided for insurance
against death or injury by external means leaving a visible
mark on the body. A subsequent independent paragraph
covenanted to pay one-tenth the value of the face of the policy
if the injury causing death left no visible marks, " or if such
injury or death shall result from the intentional acts of any
person other than the insured." The death of the insured
resulted from the intentional act of another, which left its
visible mark on his body, and the court held that the beneficiary was entitled to recover the whole amount of the policy.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey has lately
passed upon a very interesting point of insurance law, in
Credit
Lauer v. Gray, 37 At. Rep. 52. The plaintiffs
Policy,
held a policy of insurance against the loss of credits
Construction,
Premiums,
Renewals

for goods shipped and loss occurring between the

commencement and expiration thereof, which contained a provision that " if this certificate is renewed by the
-said above-named party on or before the date of its expiration,
at the regular terms of the company in force at the time of
such renewal, then, in that case, losses occurring after the
expiration of this certificate on goods shipped between the
commencement and the expiration thereof shall be provable
under .the
renewal in the same manner as if losses occurred
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on goods shipped after the commencement of the renewal."
Losses occurred upon this original policy in accordance with
its terms and conditions, which, upon adjustment and allowance by the insurers, were not paid to the insured, but retained
by the insurers, under an agreement made subsequent to the
expiration of the policy, that upon the cancellation thereof such
losses should serve as the payment of a premium for a renewal
policy; but these losses were not adjusted, the original policy
was not cancelled, and the renewal policy was not executed
and delivered until after the original policy had expired. The
insurer subsequently went into the hands of a receiver, who
refused to allow a claim for losses on goods shipped during
the life of the original policy, but occurring after its expiration,
under a condition in the renewal policy that "if this certificate
has been paid for on or before the date of the expiration of the
certificate held by the above-named party last prior to this one,
then, in that case, losses occurring during the life of this certificate on goods shipped during the term of the last prior one
shall be included in the calculation-of losses under this certificate, in the same manner as if the goods had been shipped
and the loss had occurred during the life of this certificate,"
on the ground that the premium was not paid on or before
the expiration of the prior policy, and the new policy was
therefore not a renewal. The plaintiffs appealed to the court
of chancery, which dismissed their petition; but this decree
was reversed by the court of errors and appeals, which held
that the retention of the losses on the first policy under the
agreement constituted payment of the renewal premium " on
or before the date of the expiration" of the original policy, and
was a sufficient compliance with the last-named condition;
that the tvo policies were connected together, and had
reference to each other ; that the adjustment of loss, the cancellation of the first policy, the agreement to retain the loss in
lieu of renewal premium, and the execution and delivery of
the renewal policy, had relation to the life of the prior policy,
the losses upon which, by virtue of the agreement, constituted
the payment of the renewal premium, by reason of the situation which existed before the expiration of the original policy,
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to which the renewal had reference; that it was immaterial,
under the circumstances, that the execution and delivery of
the renewal was postponed until the adjustment of the losses
and the cancellation of the former policy could be accomplished;
that when the obligation of the insurer to issue and deliver thecertificate of renewal, accepting, in payment of the renewal
premium, the losses coming to the insured upon the prior
policy when these were adjusted and the policy cancelled, was
established, the payment related back to the life of the prior
policy, and was of the time during which those losses occurred;.
and the mere delay during negotiations, to put the obligation
into a written agreement or. contract, or to embody it in a
formal certificate of renewal, did not alter or extinguish that
obligation; and that equity will impute the intention to fulfil
such an obligation, and when necessary to protect and enforcethe just rights of the parties, will assume the obligation to
have been fulfilled, in'accordance with the principle that equity
looks upon that which ought to be done as already done.
When a life insurance policy provides that if, within two,
years from the date thereof, "the said assured shall, whether
sane or insane, die by his own hand, then this.
Life
policy shall be null and void," the insurer will not
insurance,
be liable if within the two years, the assured,.
Suicide
whether sane or insane, commits suicide, and the liability ofthe insurer is not affected by the degree of insanity : Spruillv.
Northwestern Nut. Life ns. Co., (Supreme Court of North
Carolina,) 27 S. E. Rep. 39.
In this case the proof of death stated that the assured died!
by a "pistol shot from his hand; " and this, unexplained, was;
held to throw on the plaintiff the burden of proof that thedecedent did not commit suicide, and to warrant the directing
of a verdict for the defendant.
When a landlord undertakes to put a new roof on thedemised premises, at the request of his tenant, he will be liable.
Landlordand to the tenant for injurycaused by the negligent
manner in which the work is done, and cannot
Tenant,
Repairs,

Negligence

exonerate himself by commritting it to an independ-
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ent contractor: Wertheimer v. Saunders, (Supreme Court of
Wisconsin,) 70 N. W. Rep. 824.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has recently held, that
-a charge that a candidate for public office "did violate the
law and take fees to which he was not entitled,"
Libel,
Candidate
is libelous per se; that although it was made
for Office,

Privileged
Communications

on a proper occasion and from a proper motive,
the plaintiff being at the time a candidate for

office, the defendant will not be relieved of responsibility when
he not only fails to show the truth of the statement but also
to establish that it was based on a reasonable or probable
cause; and that in such a case it is not sufficient to show
-that the defendant had information which led him to believe it
was true; but that the circumstances leading to that belief
-must be shown, in order that it may appear whether or not it
-was well founded: Coates v. Wallace, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 253.
A publication in a newspaper, falsely charging a police
officer with extortion, in purposely swelling the amount of a
prisoner's fine, collecting the same of the prisoner's
Libel,
Privilege,
family to procure his discharge and pocketing the
-Dissemlnatloq

of News
difference, is libelous; and though it was made
without malice or improper motives, and for the dissemination
of news and information to the citizens of the locality, it is not
-privileged thereby: Benton v. State, (Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey,) 36 Atl. Rep. 1041.

In a case recently decided by the Court of Appeal of England, Tate v. Latham, [897] i Q. B. 502, the plaintiff was
Master and employed at defendant's saw-mills to assist one of
Servant,
their sawyers, who was engaged at a circular saw.
Defective
The defendants had provided the saw with a suffiMachinery,
.Act of Fellow cient guard or fence under the bench for the
Servant
prevention of accidents. The guard
was made
•moveable, in order to remove the sawdust which collected
-under the bench. The sawyer improperly removed the guard
,for his own purposes, and while it was off the plaintiff fell
against the saw and was injured. The absence of the guard
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was held to be a defect in the condition of the machinery,
within § i of the Employers' Liability Act, 188o, which gives
a workman the same remedy against his employer as if he had
not been in his service, when personal injury is caused to him
"by reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works,
machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of
the employer."
This would not be law in the United States at the present
time; but as the day is not far distant when we shall have
statutes similar to the one cited, it is worth while to study its.
interpretation, in order that we may know the consequences.
of such legislation. The ruling in this case certainly tends to.
overthrow all the established rules as to the negligence of
fellow servants.
The motorman of an electric street railway car, who occupies a position analogous to that of the engineer of a steam.
railroad train, is a fellow servant with the track
Fellow
Servant
foreman: Rittenhouse v. Wilmington St. Ry. Co.,
(Supreme Court of North Carolina,) 26 S. E. Rep. 922.

A payment on a mortgage, made by an owner of the equityof redemption of part of the premises, before the statute has
Mortgage, run against the right of redemption, will inure to.
Redemption, the benefit of the owners of the equity in the
Bar of
Limitation

other portion of the mortgaged land, and remove
the bar of the statute as to the whole: Longstreet v. Brown,
(Court of Chancery of New Jersey,) 37 Atl. Rep. 56.

The Supreme Court of Kansas has adopted the rule of
reason and justice, now almost everywhere prevalent, that the
Negligence,
negligence of a husband cannot be imputed to his
Imputed,
wife,
who is riding with him over a defective
Husband
and Wife
highway, unless it can be shown that the husband.
was at the tinie under the direction and control of the.wife ;
and this, even though the journey was undertaken at the.
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solicitation of the wife. The latter fact is immaterial: Reading
TwP. v. Telfer, 4 Pac. Rep. 134.
There is a full annotation on this subject in 32 Am. L. REa.
N. S. 763 et seq.; and short notes in 33 Am. L. REG. N. S.
314, 870; 34 Am. L. REG. N. S. 97, 229, 567, 643; 35 Am.
L. REG. N. S. 527.
In Boatwright v. Chester and Media Electric Ry. Co., 4 Pa.
Super. Ct. 279; the defendant company had sent out an
excursion train, (so the opinion reads,) of three
street
cars, in charge of a motorman and two conductors,
Railways,
Disorderly

Conduct of

Passengers,

Liability of

with about two hundred and twenty-five passengers.
As the cars neared the plaintiff, who was riding

in a buggy with a friend, the passengers became
Company
uproarious, blew horns, waved flags, etc., and frightened the
horse so that he ran away, upsetting the buggy and injuring
the plaintiff The trial judge refused to charge that the verdict
of the jury must be for the defendant; and the Superior Court
held this to be error, and reversed the judgment, which was
for the plaintiff, on the sole ground that the company was not
responsible for the noise made by the passengers.
The reasons for this holding appear from the opinion of the
court: "If the company deliberately loaded its cars with
excursionists equipped with horns and flags, knowing they
intended to wave flags and blow horns along the route, and
thereby frighten horses lawfully upon the highway, for such
conduct it might be held liable. Or if it knowingly permitted
such demonstrations from time to time as a part of its business
upon the road, so as to become a nuisance and constant menace
to persons driving vehicles upon the highway, they undoubtedly
would be liable for the result of such nuisance and menace.
.There
But there are no such circumstancesin this case......
was no evidence that the company, its conductors or employes,
anticipated any unusual noise on the part of the passengers.
...
. The company was under no obligation to provide a
police force in anticipation of riots..... .The sudden outburst of passengers in a noisy demonstration was not an
occurrence that the appellant was bound to anticipate or
guard against."
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According to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a gift
of a pension check for an amount exceeding twenty-five
dollars, by a pensioner of the United States, in
Pensions,
IllegalFee
consideration that the donee would provide
for him during the rest of his life, and for his burial on his
death, is not invalid under the pension laws of the United
States, which provide that the fee for prosecuting a pension
claim shall not exceed twenty-five dollars, though the gift be
to the attorney who procured the allowance of the pension,
and be made as a result of the donee's services in securing the
pension: Schwab v. Ginkinger, 37 Atl. Rep. 125.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has lately ruled that in an
action against a physician for malpractice, it is not erroneous to
Physicians,
Degree of
Skill

charge that he is required " to exercise the degree
of skill possessed by physicians practising in this
locality," instead of "that possessed by physicians

practising in similar localities:"
Rep. 750.

Witesell v. Hill, 70 N. W.

When a testator wills his property to his wife during widowPower,
hood, with absolute power to dispose of it by will,
To Dispose of and she executes this power by devising the
Property by
property to volunteers, leaving debts of her own
Wi,
Execution,
unprovided for, the property so devised becomes
Effect
a part of her estate on her death,
and is subject to
the claims of her creditors: Freeman v. Butters, (Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia,) 26 S. E. Rep. 845.
In Burke v. Short, (Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit,)
79 Fed. Rep. 6, a decree for the distribution of the proceeds
Railroad
of a sale under the foreclosure of a mortgage, which
Bonds,
Coupons,
provided that the coupons of the bonds secured by
Foreclosure, it should be preferred over the principal, directed
Distribution
of Proceeds
that the surplus, after paying preferred claims,
should be equally divided among the bonds, paying a certain
sum, less than the face of the bond, to the holder of each
bond. Some of the coupons which had matured prior to the
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foreclosure were subsequently detached from the bonds, and
their holder petitioned 'to intervene, in order to collect the
coupons. The circuit court of appeals held, affirming the
decision of the circut court, that though the decree mentioned
bonds only, it could not be construed as intended to disregard
the preference of the coupons, but was intended to deal with
the ownership of bonds with their coupons, when the holders
of each were the same, and that the holder of the detached
coupons was therefore entitled to be paid their full value; and
further, that coupons which had not matured at the time of
the foreclosure, though merged thereby in the principal of the
'bonds, were entitled, when detached and separated from the
bonds in ownership, to be paid proportionately with the
remainder of the principal.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has recently
decided, that a railroad company, which purchased the propRailroad
erty and franchises of another railroad company at
Companies,
Mandamus, foreclosure sale, will not be compelled by manMaintenance damus to continue to maintain and operate a
of Branch

Road
branch road, the maintenance and operation of.
which with its terminal has proved for several years a serious
loss to the company, when the same business can be handled
with reasonable facility, and at much less expense, through
another terminal, although the terminal abandoned was constructed in consideration of a subscription to the stock of the
original-company by the town in which the terminal was situated, and although the Code of Virginia, § 1234, as amended
by Acts Va. 1891-2, p. 623, provides.that a corporation which
purchases the property of another at foreclosure sale, or succeeds it by reorganization,- shall perform the duty "of maintaining and operating any branch or lateral road which may
have been constructed and operated before the sale:" Sherwood v. Atlantic & Danville R. R. Co., 26 S. E. Rep. 943.
While this decision- may be law to the extent that the courts
will not enforce the doing of a useless thing, it certainly is bad
morals to permit a duty incurred on a valid consideration, performed by the other party, to be lightly violated in this way;
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and though the corporation may not be compelled to perform
the duty, it should certainly be held to have forfeited its
frafichises by refusing to perform it.
Similarly, mandamus will not lie to compel a street railroad
'company to continue to operate its lines over certain streets,
when its charter imposes no specific obligations,
Street
Railroads,

and the ordinance giving the franchise on the

Operation of
Line,
Mandamus

streets merely granted "the privilege" of constructing and maintaining street railways over the

lines designated therein: San Antonio St. Ry. Co. v. State,
(Supreme Court of Texas,) 39 S. W. Rep. 926, reversing 38
S. W. Rep. 54.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently held,
in Gladson v. State of Minnesota, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 627,
affirming 57 Minn. 385, that a state statute (Laws
Railroads,
Stopping of Minn. 1893, p. 173,) requiring every regular pasTrains,
,Constitutional sengef train running wholly within the limits of
the state to stop at all stations at county seats
Law
directly in its course, to take on and discharge passengers, is
a valid exercise of the police power of the state, and is neither
a taking of the property of the company without due process
of law, nor an unconstitutional interference with interstate
,commerce or with the transportation of the United States mails.
Since a telegraph company has the right to choose its own
.agencies for the delivery of messages, and to require that messages given it for transmission shall be in
Telegraph
writing, it is not a discrimination against one
Companies,
Discrimination,
telephone company to refuse to deliver teleTelephone
grams to its subscribers by its telephones, payCompanies
ing it for the use of them, or to receive messages by its telephones to be telegraphed, though by contract with another
telephone company messages are so delivered and received
by means of its telephones: People v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
(Supreme Court of Illinois,) 46 N. E. Rep. 731.
It was also held in this case that a statute requiring a
-telegraph company to receive and transmit messages from
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-other telegraph companies, does not compel it to receive verbal
messages by telephone.
In Hill v. Hill, [1897] i Q. B. 483, the Court of Appeal of
England recently held that a statement by the widow of a peer
in a letter or memorandum sent to her solicitor
Trust,
Precatory
that certain diamonds had been given to her upon
her marriage by the mother of her husband, then heir presumptive to the peerage, for her life, with the request that at her
.death they might be left as heirlooms, did not import a precatory trust, and that the absolute property in the diamonds
consequently passed to the donee.
The legislature only, and not the state officers, has power to
.accept a bequest to the state in trust; the adoption by both
Wills,
houses of the legislature of the report of a joint
Bequest to committee, recommending that a bill accepting a
State,
bequest to the state be not passed, is a rejection of
the bequest; and evidence that the committee was misled by
.a decision construing the will is inadmissible, when the reasons
of the committee for its action were not reported to the legislature, since the reasons for the action of individual members
are not admissible to affect a legislative act: State v. Blake,
<Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,) 36 Atl. Rep. ioi9.
Relection
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